housed, 4 is not offensive to me because it downgrades doctrinal scholarship: it is offensive because it downgrades. 5 While it is unavoidable that scare resources for research will have to be allocated among a much larger pool of researchers, it diminishes both the argument and the protagonist if this mutates into an argument about why certain methodologies (and by extension those adopting them) are more "important" or "worthy" than others. Of course, someone will have to make a judgement about what to fund and who to appoint, and it is entirely right that the nature of the research will play a pivotal role. But that is not the same as concluding, or promoting the idea, that a whole way of researching should ex hypothesi be regarded as second rate or, even worse, denied the label "research" at all.
It is against the background of this prejudice that I want to think about a doctrinal approach to property law scholarship. 
The What and the How
A doctrinal approach to property law is initially the search for what the law is, not what it should be. That does not mean to say that a scholar engaged in the search for the norms of, say, the law concerning registered title, is unconcerned with inconsistencies or conflicts, and certainly a rigorous doctrinal analysis should sit within the framework of the policy aims of (say) the legislation that is being analysed.
Yet, the "research" proceeds on the basis that it is important to expose the norms applicable to the area of property law under examination. So, when a property lawyer engaged in doctrinal research talks of critical analysis, they mean a dissection of the law as is, examining it for consistency and coherence, as well as a critical appreciation of the law in terms of policy-compatibility and future development.
Furthermore, while it is true that "simply" stating the law looks more like rule- A doctrinal analysis of an area within property law commonly has the following features. Given that I would reject any attempt to rank research methodologies in order of importance or value, these features should not be regarded as prescriptive or definitional. However, they will be familiar to those engaged in the enterprise.
(i) The researcher will focus on a reasonably well-defined area of property law, apparently (but not actually) in ignorance of broader conceptual concerns. The focus might be to examine a thread running across a wider topic (for example, the meaning of title guarantee under the Land Registration Act 2002, or a closed-off issue with well defined parameters (for example, the circumstances in which a court will order sale of co-owned land under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996). This can lead to the criticism that the researcher lacks "breadth of vision" or fails to add to the broader fund of knowledge because the author does not explain how this work fits into one of the "accepted" theoretical models of how property law works. Certainly, it is true that those engaged in doctrinal research rarely seek to justify their work within an over-arching theoretical framework -such as an economic analysis of law or a critical legal studies analysis -but the reason is not that this could not be done; it is rather that it is not the point of what is being done.
(2) The research rarely commences with a literature review, at least not in the accepted social science sense. This is, of course, entirely consistent with the absence of any attempt to locate the research within a wider field of theoretical understanding.
That is not to say, however, that those engaged in doctrinal research fail to incorporate academic literature. The research is not all about "the rules". Typically, however, the 10 However, whatever the purpose of the enquiry, the first step is the gathering of relevant statute and case law in order to state conclusions about the law. In property law, for the doctrinal scholar, the more case law the better. Moreover, the doctrinal researcher sees value in both the process of "law discovery" and the result of the discovery. For many such researchers, the elucidation of the current law is a goal in itself, and they would argue that such an enquiry is not only necessary for other types of research, but is of itself sufficient to justify the energy and effort. It is, of course, a large claim that a sound doctrinal foundation is necessary for other types of research -and not one that all doctrinal researchers would subscribe to -but perhaps it is not going too far to suggest that a sound analysis of "where we are now" adds weight to work that seeks to take property law away from its rule-centric past.
Certainly, those engaged in doctrinal research find it difficult to be persuaded by the an alteration or rectification of the register. There is much to be said for the vieweven though I would not subscribe to it -that the Land Registration Act 2002 gives too much recognition to the formal act of title registration and too little to the general population's underlying social, economic and emotional conception of "ownership".
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However, an argument that proceeds in ignorance or deliberate misinterpretation of the actual statutory provisions and the surrounding case law will carry little weight with a doctrinal scholar. No doubt it is not the intention, but a research methodology that eschews at least some assessment of the current state of the law can give the appearance of bending the law to fit the argument, rather than making the argument to change the law.
(5) A typical result of a doctrinal analysis of property law is a statement of the state of the law as it now is, combined with an attempt to explain any revealed inconsistencies in the case law. 12 However, that explanation (of the inevitable inconsistencies) is rarely located in an appeal to "policy" or empirical evidence, but rather in an analysis of why the deviant case has to be regarded as "wrongly decided" or, more respectfully, "decided by reference to its own special facts". There is an understanding that the rules will not form an entirely cohesive and coherent doctrine, but there may be an unspoken desire that it should! Thus, the primary aims are usually synthesis, explanation and clarity. These might not be the final destination of the doctrinal analysis, but for many it is the sine qua non. This is, however, where much of the criticism of the doctrinal approach has its roots. 
The where next
There is a perception, and perhaps it is no more than that, that the heyday of doctrinal legal scholarship has passed. Certainly, it is not a novel methodology and unlikely to be "the next best thing". It can be criticised as being outmoded, harking back to a time when both research and teaching was rigid and black letter. The implication is that it is not fit for purpose in the modern legal world. Doctrinal scholars sometimes counter this by pleading that the skills required to engage in a critical analysis and synthesis of a mass of primary materials are not easily come by. The implication is that doctrinal analysis is "hard" and those who eschew it, cannot do it. Neither of these assertions are helpful, and both are misplaced. There is, of course, a role for all types of research methodology in property law and, as noted above, doctrinal research supports one of the core concerns of modern property law -legal certainty. But not only do other methodologies dispute that legal certainty should be the main concern of land law, they challenge the smug certainty of the doctrinal scholar that the systemisation of legal rules is inherently valuable. It is up to doctrinal scholars to meet the challenges revealed by other methodologies and to explain why what they do is important.
Failing to do that is a failure of doctrinal legal scholarship.
